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Abstract
This paper examines the determinants of financial derivatives use in the United
Kingdom (UK) life insurance industry. We estimate a probit regression model and a
Heckman two-stage sample selection regression model using a sample of 88 UK life
insurers in 1995. Our results indicate that the propensity to use derivative instruments
is positively related to a firm’s size, leverage and international links, and negatively
related to the extent of reinsurance. We also find that mutual life insurance firms have a
greater propensity to use derivatives than proprietary firms. The positive relation with
leverage and the negative relation with reinsurance support the hypothesis that UK life
insurers use derivatives to offset risk, rather than as a speculative means of income
generation.
1. Introduction
Life insurance firms may use financial derivatives either as part of a risk
management strategy or as a means of income generation. On the one hand,
researchers have acknowledged the importance of financial derivatives in alleviating
the effects of volatile interest rates and exchange rates on the asset values of insurance
firms. Such hedging activities can ensure the survival of those entities in increasingly
competitive environments (.g. see Hoyt, 1989a, 1989b; Wilson and Hollman, 1995;
Colquitt and Hoyt, 1996, 1997; Cummins et al, 1997; Hentschel and Smith, 1997).1 On
the other hand, Cummins et al (1997) have also reported that managers in insurance
firms may be tempted to avoid external scrutiny and use financial derivatives to
enhance reported annual earnings rather than to transfer risk and that speculative
activity of this kind may increase the risk of insolvency.
Financial derivatives include such instruments as futures, options and invariably
swaps, which can either be traded on public exchanges or treated as over-the-counter
transactions.2 The growth in derivatives trading has greatly expanded managerial
opportunities to manage risks and enhance the value of insurance companies and other
firms operating in the financial services sector, such as banks (Sinkey and Carter,
1997). Indeed, the importance of derivatives to the insurance industry is underpinned
by Cummins et al (1997) who report that in the United States (US), at the end of
1994, some 286 life and property-casualty insurers held derivatives valued at
approximately $418 billion. However, as Colquitt and Hoyt (1996, p. 149) observe,
shareholders, policyholders, industry regulators and others with a direct interest in the
operational performance of the insurance industry have " . . . come to recognize not
only the benefits of derivatives trading . . . but also the potential misuse and abuse . .
.".  Hentschel and Smith (1997) share this view and consider that a better
understanding of the reasons for participation in financial derivative markets by the
insurance industry can help to improve the management and control of such
instruments. Moreover,  Hoyt (1989a, 1989b) points out that as the value of long-term
insurance contracts, particularly those with guaranteed returns, is sensitive to interest
rate fluctuations and inflation, it is likely that the use of derivatives would be more
appropriate to life insurance firms rather than general insurers. Cummins et al (1997)
provide evidence from the US insurance market to substantiate this claim (see section
2). In the present study, we focus on the UK life insurance industry and seek to isolate
those factors which explain both the decision to employ financial derivatives and the
extent of that usage by firms operating in that industry.3
This paper contributes to the growing literature on the use of derivatives in the
financial services sector in five principal regards. First, the study could contribute
insights into the motives underlying insurance firms' activities in financial derivative
markets and as such be of interest to industry regulators, ratings agencies, actuaries
and others concerned about the potential misuse of derivatives and the adverse
implications which that might have for the future solvency of insurance firms. Second,
the study could be of relevance to those parties that contribute to the current and
future capital needs of insurance firms. For instance, a relation between derivatives
usage and firm-specific characteristics, such as size and organiz tional form, could help
policyholders and shareholders to better assess financial risks and thus make more
informed insurance and investment decisions. Third, a comprehensive analysis of the
utilization of derivatives has not previously been carried out in the UK insurance
sector. Therefore, the results of this study could be used to compare and evaluate the
results reported in studies carried out elsewhere, notably in the US insurance markets
(e.g. Hoyt, 1989a; Colquitt and Hoyt, 1996, 1997; Cummins et al, 1997). Fourth, our
study extends the existing literature by testing the influence of organizational
operations (e.g. in overseas markets) on the decision to use derivatives. This factor has
not been examined in other derivatives research concerned with insurance markets.
Fifth, by focusing on the life insurance industry, our research project is able to control
for the potentially confounding effects that differences in reporting practices, industry
regulations and investment opportunities could have in wider studies (e.g., see Staking
and Babbel, 1995, p. 702).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section provides
background information on the use of financial derivatives by US and UK insurance
firms and explains the importance of derivatives to life insurers. Section 3 discusses the
determinants of derivative use derived from the corporate finance literature. Section 4
describes the research design, including the sources of data, the models employed and
measurement of the variables. Section 5 analyses the results, while the final section
concludes the paper.
2.  Background
Financial derivatives comprise various types of contracts ranging from the more
usual futures, options and swaps, to other more complex forms, such as exotic
instruments. Cummins et al(1997) found that, in the US insurance industry, roughly
half of the total number of derivative instruments used by insurers in 1994 were swaps,
although the value of these was relatively low at $29 billion. The most important
derivatives used by US insurers in value terms were options amounting to roughly
$224 billion at the end of 1994. In contrast, few exotic forms of derivative instruments
appear to have been used by US insurers. The number of derivative users were split
evenly between life (144 firms) and property-casualty insurance users (142 firms),
although at the end of 1994, life insurers accounted for approximately 90 per cent of
the $418 billion total value of insurer derivative positions. This evidence suggests that
financial derivative markets are more important to life insurers than to property-
casualty insurers and supports the contention of Hoyt (1989a, 1989b), which we
highlighted earlier.
In the UK, the Insurance Companies Regulations (1994) require insurers to
report details of the number, type and value of derivative contracts on the new Form
13A of their annual solvency returns, which they file with the Department of Trade and
Industry (DTI) (Gallen and Kipling, 1996). From this source, we ascertained that in
1995, 67 out of a population of approximately 270 UK life insurers reported the use of
derivative instruments with a total notional (i.e. face) value of £809.5 million. It
appears that the most common forms of derivative instruments used by UK life insurers
are option contracts, particularly those involving the exchange of equities. In 1995, the
asset values of these contracts was £362.9 million. Under the 1994 regulations UK-
based insurers should not use financial derivatives for speculat y purposes. Rather
such instruments may only be used for improved risk management purposes and to
minimize investment risks. Indeed, the derivative positions adopted by UK life insurers
should be monitored by appointed actuaries and the Department of Trade and Industry
in their monitoring of annual corporate solvency (Gall  and Kipling, 1997). Some
direction regarding the actuarial treatment of financial derivatives is also provided by
the UK actuarial profession in its 1996 Guidance Note No. 25 on Investment
Derivatives Instruments. However, because of the lack of transparency in the UK
associated with the accounting for financial derivatives and their disclosure in annual
reports (Accounting Standards Board, 1997), there is scope for life insurers to
speculate on derivatives markets and for such trading to remain undetected.
Although UK life insurance firms appear to participate in financial derivative
markets to a lesser degree than US life insurance firms, the amounts involved are not
trivial and appear to be increasing. Currently, life insurance firms in the UK generate
domestic annual premiums of approximately £47 bi lion (Association of British
Insurers, 1996). This makes the UK the third largest provider of long-term insurance
business in Europe (after France and Germany) and one of the major life insurance
markets in the world (with the US and Japan being the two leading markets
respectively). As in the US, many UK life insurers (e.g. Axa Sun Life, Standard Life)
are multinational enterprises and thus likely to have large positions in foreign securities
and/or large amounts of assets held by overseas-based subsidiaries. Such exposure to
foreign exchange volatility means that derivative-based hedging strategies are likely to
be attractive to many firms in the UK life insurance industry both now and in the
future. This means that the economic incentives for derivatives usage reported in the
US life insurance industry by Colquitt and Hoyt (1996, 1997), Cummins et al (1997)
and others, is expected to be equally germane to the UK life insurance industry,
thereby facilitating comparison and evaluation of empirical results across the two
jurisdictions. Along with the US, the UK is now one of the few major insurance
centres to publish statistics on derivatives usage. These attributes therefore make the
UK life insurance industry an interesting and useful environment within which to
conduct our research.
3. Theoretical framework
Colquitt and Hoyt (1996) consider that insurance firms will employ derivatives
for various reasons. For example, they contend that although shareholders may be able
to diversify financial risks cost-efficiently by holding balanced portfolios of
investments, managers are less efficient bearers of such risks. Oldfield and Santomero
(1997) suggest two reasons why managers are inefficient at diversifying risks: first,
their personal wealth is limited; and second, they have a concentrated and non-
transferable human capital stake in the firm (e.g.accumulated business knowledge).
The inability of managers to bear risks efficiently increases the prospects of insolvency
and generates costs of financial distress (e.g. lo t orders, higher cost of capital and so
on). As a result, the owners of insurance firms will have to compensate their managers
for bearing increased risks by giving them more attractive compensation packages
(Kleffner and Doherty, 1996). By shifting risk to the financial derivative markets,
owners of firms can mitigate such agency costs and reduce the prospects of
bankruptcy. Furthermore, Hentschel and Smith (1997) point out that the continued
ability of insurers to meet the fixed claims of policyholders is a matter of fundamental
importance to both current and future generations of customers. They argue that
reducing the probability of financial distress enables insurance firms to improve their
reputations for prudent management and increase the average level of premiums that
policyholders are willing to pay, thereby generating app opriable rents and reducing
their future market cost of capital.
However, as Colquitt and Hoyt (1997, p. 650) report, regulators " . . . have
come to recognize not only the benefits of derivatives trading by insurers but also the
potential misuse and abuse that could accompany an unregulated use of these financial
instruments." Indeed, in 1994, the US Hawaiian-based Equity Life Company lost US
$90 million in trading bond futures, thereby giving substance to public concerns as to
the need for the sound management and internal and external control of derivatives for
the sake of life insurer solvency and the future protection of shareholders' and
policyholders' claims.
In spite of the possibility that financial derivatives could be used by insurers for
speculative rather than risk management/risk transfer purposes, Colquitt and Hoyt
(1996, p. 152) acknowledge that speculation can have benefits in that " . . . by
increasing participation in the futures market . . . [speculators] . . . provide hedgers
with a more liquid market in which to hedge . . . ".  H ntschel and Smith (1997) further
argue that because most prior studies report empirical relations between the managerial
demand for risk transfer through derivatives and firm-specific characteristics (such as
leverage), speculative motives are likely to be subordinate to the hedging incentives of
insurance firms. Nonetheless, the fact that derivatives can be used for both hedging and
income enhancement purposes further underscores the need for academics, industry
regulators and others to obtain deeper insights into what motivates the decision to use
derivatives in the life insurance industry.
Prior studies reported in the corporate finance literature (e.g. Smith and Stulz,
1985; Froot, Scharfstein and Stein, 1993; Nance et al, 1993) contend that the use of
derivatives to hedge financial risks can also be influenced by environmental factors,
notably taxation rules. For example, Froot et al (1993) report that under the
progressive tax codes that characterize most developed countries, like the UK and US,
the taxation schedule for most firms will follow a convex function of reported earnings
and that as a result, hedging through the use of derivatives can substantially alleviate
cash flow volatilities and thus reduce the expected taxes of firms. Nance et al(1993)
add that the existence of tax shields, such as loss carry forward provisions and foreign
tax credits, enhances the convexity of the effective taxation schedule of most firms and
further contributes to the managerial incentives to use hedging instruments in order to
increase the traded value of firms. However, to our knowledge, there is no empirical
evidence that firms in the USA or the UK actually use derivatives in this way in an
attempt to minimise their tax liabilities.
To sum up, modern corporate finance theory suggests that managers actively
use derivatives to alleviate market imperfections and reduce firm-specific exposure to
financial risks which could create high volatility in firm cash flows and result in a
reduction in shareholder value. Prior studies reported in the academic literature (e.g.
Froot et al, 1993; Nance et al, 1993) have found that the extent to which hedging
vehicles are employed varies according to the organizational characteristics of firms,
features which themselves reflect the underlying agency cost relationships in firms and
the response of managers to environmental phenomena, such as the effects of a
progressive corporate tax code. Colquitt and Hoyt (1997) also examine the extent of
derivatives use in relation to the corporate characteristics of US life insurance firms.
Drawing a framework from this literature, we now consider five possible determinants
of the use and financial extent of derivatives by life insurance firms: firm size; the risk
of insolvency; organizational form; taxation status; and the extent of overseas business.
Firm Size
Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Zahra and Pearce (1989), among others, argue
that as firms get bigger and their operations become more complex, information
asymmetries between the various contracting groups worsen. As a result, agency costs
(e.g. screening and monitoring expenditures) increase in order to prevent opportunistic
behaviour by managers and enable ex post contractual realignment, if necessary. For
instance, Zahra and Pearce (1989, p. 294) report that " . . . as firms become bigger, the
control function becomes vital. Large organizational size is often associated with
complex operations that require careful integration . . . [and close monitoring] . . . ".
Cummins et al (1997) contend that as shareholders are expected to be better able than
managers to diversify risks by holding mixed asset portfolios, the existence of hedging
through financial derivative markets is likely to be a manifestation of the attenuated
agency problems found in large firms. Nance et al (1993) also suggest that hedging
could be a convenient mechanism by which agency incentive conflicts inside large firms
can be mitigated. They state (p. 270) that to reduce agency costs, the firm must assure
contracting groups “. . . that wealth transfers will not take place, either via restrictive
covenants . . .or hedging . . . ". One example of a prospective agency incentive conflict
inside firms is the under-investment problem whereby shareholders will be disinclined
to invest in positive net present value projects (e.g. the re-building of plant and
machinery after an environmental disaster) because the benefits of such investment will
accrue to debtholders ather than themselves.
Smith and Stulz (1985) also contend that large firms are expected to use
derivatives more than small firms because they can realize informational and scale
economies from the activity. Large firms are also likely to have sufficient resources to
train and employ personnel with expertise in the management and use of derivatives,
whereas small firms are unlikely to have access to such specialist managerial skills
(Hoyt, 1989a). Furthermore, large firms are expected to utilize erivatives to a greater
extent than smaller firms because they are likely to engage in a wider variety of
activities (Sinkey and Carter, 1997). However, other researchers (e.g. Nance et al,
1993) suggest that the empirical relation between hedging and firm size may be
negative rather than positive. One reason for this is that small firms have higher
exposure to prospective bankruptcy than large firms and so will use derivatives to
hedge the risk of incurring the costs of financial distress. However, the vast body of
empirical evidence from the insurance industry (e.g. Hoyt, 1989a, Colquitt and Hoyt,
1996, 1997; Cummins et al, 1997) supports a positive relation between firm size and
the use of derivatives.4
Risk of insolvency
On the assumption that risk minimization through hedging is the main motive
for derivative use by life insurance firms, we might expect to find a positive link
between the use of derivatives and the risk of insolvency. There are a number of proxy
variables that might be used as indicators of the risk of insolvency. We consider the
following three: leverage, asset-liability mismatch and the extent of re-insurance.
(a) Leverage   Agency theory-based studies, such as Jensen and Meckling (1976) and
Smith and Warner (1979), among others, contend that increased leverage in firms
induces high agency costs for suppliers of debt capital. For instance, when a firm's
capital structure comprises debt, contractual covenants, such as those restricting the
substitution of collaterized assets for those over which debt olders do not have a claim
(i.e. me-first rules), have to be written so that debt olders are protected against a
dilution of their rights to regular repayments of principal and interest. A highly
leveraged posture also increases the expected costs of financial distress for firms and
raises the possibility of bankruptcy. Colquitt and Hoyt (1997, p. 655) report that in the
life insurance industry an operative " . . . with a higher probability of insolvency would
benefit more from a decrease in the variance of firm value than would an insurer with a
lower probability of insolvency. Therefore, the higher an insurer's leverage, the more
likely it is to use derivatives . . . " . Staking and Babbel (1995) add that highly
leveraged insurance firms will hedge in order to protect their corporate franchise value
from losses arising from financial distress. For instance, they state (p. 698) that because
“. . . the franchise is valuable, and this value may be lost in the event of insolvency or
financial distress, the insurer will expend resources to protect it.” Moreover,
managerial action to control leverage and mitigate the risk of financial distress through
the use of financial derivatives could have advantageous signalling effects for
prospective investors and policyholders of insurance firms (e.g. by providing surety as
to the entity’s future as a going concern).
In contrast, Sinkey and Carter (1997) point out that in the financial services
sector, industry regulators may prohibit highly leveraged (low equity financed) firms
from participating in derivative markets because they perceive that involvement in new
financial management activities is risky and thus a threat to future corporate solvency.
However, most of the relevant academic literature does not support this contention.
For example, Mayers and Smith (1987) and N ce et al (1993) report that the higher
expected probability of financial distress associated with increased leverage enhances
the under-investment incentive in firms and that this problem can be alleviated by
hedging vehicles, such as derivative instruments and/or insurance. This reasoning
therefore suggests that highly leveraged life insurers are more likely to use derivatives
than lowly leveraged life insurers. De Marzo and Duffie (1995) also propose that
hedging may be used by highly leveraged firms to signal to the capital markets positive
information concerning future solvency, managerial ability and prospectively sound
financial performance. Such signals may not only mitigate the possible costs of
financial distress, but also reduce the future market cost of capital. However, the
empirical evidence concerning the relation between hedging and capital structure has
been mixed. For example, in their cross-sectional US-based study, N nce et al (1993)
do not find evidence to support a positive linkage between hedging and leverage.
However, studies from the life insurance industry (e.g. Colquitt and Hoyt, 1996, 1997)
are more supportive of a hypothesized direct relation between derivative usage and
firms' leverage. As a consequence, we predict a positive relation between the use and
extent of financial derivatives by life insurers and their leverage.
(b) Asset-Liability Mismatch   One way to measure firms’ vulnerability to financial
risks would be to examine the duration of their assets and liabilities (Sinkey and Carter,
1997). Indeed, several researchers (e.g. Hoyt, 1989b, Colquitt and Hoyt, 1996, 1997;
Cummins et al, 1997; Santomero and Babbel, 1997) consider that because of the long-
term nature of life insurance policies and the various fixed and flexible options that
they contain (e.g. guaranteed returns or flexible premium terms), managers (notably
actuaries) in life insurance firms have to take cognisance of the need to match the
actuarial value and maturity of liabilities with their underlying assets. Over the long
term, the value of life insurers’ assets is particularly sensitive, being subject to the
possibility of dilution by the combined effects of inflation, interest rate movements and
foreign exchange rate fluctuations which can increase the costs of financial distress.
Such a prospective situation requires that actuaries in life insurance firms will routinely
attempt to hedge balance sheet duration gaps (a process called immunization). In
addition, the persistency of life insurance policies could be adversely affected by
macro-economic factors, such as a severe economic recession. In other words,  the
default risk associated with life insurance business-in-force may be greater than that
expected by the actuaries in their ex ante pricing of life insurance products. Indeed,
Santomero and Babbel (1997, p. 246) report that in recent years many US-based life
insurers " . . . feel that they do not have enough reliable data on which to specify the
relation of lapses and policy surrenders to interest movements." Therefore, life insurers
that match closely the duration of their assets and liabilities are expected to have less
need for hedging through financial derivatives compared with those life insurance firms
that mis-match their assets and liabilities. Prior studies (e.g. C mmins et al, 1997) also
cite evidence supporting this contention.
(c) Reinsurance   Adams (1996) finds that reinsurance is an important mechanism for
alleviating the risk-bearing  problem in New Zealand-based life insurers. Cummins et al
(1997) also consider reinsurance to be a long-established mechanism in the insurance
industry for hedging against unanticipated underwriting losses and financial risks, such
as interest rate exposure. Therefore, reinsurance can help to alleviate the financing
strain associated with the writing of new business (e.g. due to high up-front sales
commissions) and reduce the volatilities in the operational cash flows of life insurance
firms. Under this perspective the level of  reinsurance held by life insurers is expected
to substitute for economic hedging through the use of financial derivatives. Indeed,
Joseph and Hewins (1997, p. 164) state that " . . . a firm that employs hedging
substitutes is likely to hedge less . . . ". Alternatively, the extent to which life insurance
firms utilize reinsurance could reflect managements' predisposition for and experience
of hedging techniques. This reasoning suggests that the empirical relation between the
use of derivatives and reinsurance could be complementary rather than substitutive
(Colquitt and Hoyt, 1997). However, Nance et al (1993, p., 281) contend that whereas
" . . . management [in insurance firms] . . . should be familiar with reinsurance since it
is a normal component of their business. . .[such] familiarity is less likely for the
financial hedging instruments." Their analysis therefore implies an inverse linkage
between derivative usage in life insurance firms and the level of reinsurance. Cooper
(1996, p. 15) also supports this view when she states that in the life insurance industry
derivatives enable firms
“. . . to hedge exposure within a tra che of risk in much the same way as by effecting .
. . reinsurance”. Moreover, the empirical evidence cite  by Cummins et al (1997) in the
US property-casualty insurance industry supports a predicted substitutive relation
between derivative usage and reinsurance. Therefore, we hyp thesiz  a substitutive
relation between the use and extent of financial derivatives and the amount of
reinsurance.
Organizational Form
Adams (1995) employs the managerial-discretion hypothesis of Mayer  and
Smith (1981) to demonstrate that the balance sheet structure of life insurance firms
varies according to organizational form, that is, the mutual (i.e. policyholder) versus
proprietary or stock (i.e. shareholder) form of ownership. Such an analysis implies that
organizational form could be an important determinant of variability in the use of
derivatives among firms in the life insurance industry. For example, Cummins et al
(1997, p. 29) argue that the managerial-discretion hypothesis " . . . suggests that stocks
are expected to engage in more OBS [off-balance sheet] activity than mutuals because
stocks are more likely to be involved in complex and/or risky lines of business that give
rise to hedging." Indeed, evidence from the US insurance industry (e.g. Mayers and
Smith, 1988) indicates that stock insurers tend to assume higher levels of financial risk
than mutual insurers.Mutual insurers are, however, largely controlled by risk-averse
managers with little direct monitoring from policyholders and, unlike stock insurers,
they do not have equity capital to cushion against adverse economic shocks.
Furthermore, the shareholdings of stock insurers could be well-diversified compared
with policyholders (Kleffner and Doherty, 1996), suggesting that the owners will be
indifferent to the transference of risks through the use of hedging instruments (Colquitt
and Hoyt, 1997)5. Other commentators (e.g. Ralfe, 1996) further consider that the
transaction costs associated with derivatives (e.g. trading and management costs)
could exceed the benefits of derivatives usage and actually dilute shareholder value.
Colquitt and Hoyt (1997, p. 657) also note that as “. . . the interests of the owners and
fixed claimants are more closely aligned [in mutuals] because the policyholders ‘own’
the company . . . stock firms are less likely than mutual firms to participate in . . .
hedging activity”. Furthermore, as non-listed companies, mutuals (unlike stock
insurers) are not subject to the discipline of the market for corporate control.
Managers in mutuals could, therefore, have more freedom to counteract any reduction
in reserves (e.g. as the result of imprudent investment) by the use of financial
derivatives than their counterparts in stock firms. For these reasons, the managers of
mutuals could be more inclined to hedge than their counterparts in stock insurance
firms.
However, the managerial-discretion hypothesis contends that compared with
the disparate policyholder-owners of mutuals the relatively more closely-held owners
of stock insurers will be motivated to grant their managers more discretion over
activity choice decisions, such as hedging, because they can more effectively mitigate
the risk of aberrant managerial behaviour through increased monitoring and control.
Froot et al (1993) also consider that shareholders could benefit from hedging if they
are prohibited from diversifying their interests cost-efficiently as a result of market
imperfections (e.g. transactions costs and information asymmetries). Additionally,
managers in stock life insurance firms could be partially remunerated by stock option
schemes and as a result, they could be motivated to use derivatives to control
variations in firm value and enhance their economic utility (e.g. see Smith and Stulz,
1985). Moreover, most of the empirical evidence from the US insurance markets
indicates that stock insurers tend to engage in derivatives trading to a greater extent
than mutuals. We would tend to expect, therefore, that in the UK life insurance
industry stock companies are more likely to utilize derivatives more than mutuals and
to a much greater degree.
Taxation
Several researchers, such as Smith and S ulz (1985) and Nance et al (1993),
have hypothesized that entities with a convex tax schedule could reduce their tax
liabilities, and thus increase the traded value of the corporation by reducing the
volatility of annual reported taxable earnings. Indeed, Nance et al (1993) find evidence
in the US corporate sector to suggest that firms that hedge have larger investment tax
credits and tax carryforwards and more pre-tax income in the convex region of the tax
schedule than firms that do not use hedging instruments. Kleffner and Doherty (1996),
Hoyt and Khang (1997), among others, also argue that tax shields, such as investment
tax credits and tax loss carry forward provisions, provide additional incentives for
managers of firms to reduce the variance of taxable earnings by means of hedging
devices such as financial derivatives. Although the taxation assessment procedure for
UK-based life insurers is complex and unique (Sole, 1996), their general taxation status
could thus be an important determinant of the managerial decision to participate in
financial derivatives markets (Colquitt and Hoyt, 1997). Sinkey and Carter (1997) hold
a similar view from their analysis of derivatives usage in the US banking sector. For
instance, they state (pp. 60-61) that ". . . if hedging [through derivatives] increases the
value of the banking firm, it does so by reducing expected costs associated with taxes .
. .".  As a result, we consider that managers of life insurance firms with higher taxation
liabilities are more likely to decide to use derivatives and employ them to a much
greater extent than life insurers with lower taxation liabilities.
Overseas Business
Whilst the diversification of business operations overseas can help to reduce
corporate risks (Brealey and Myers, 1996), the substitutive effect, if any, of such
investment is unclear from the literature. Most researchers, however, suggest that the
relation between off-balance sheet hedging (e.g. through the use of derivatives) and
multinational operations is complementary. For example, Joseph and Hewins (1997)
contend that the multinational versus domestic operating status of firms is an important
influence on the managerial decision to participate in financial derivative markets. For
instance, they state (p. 164) that the geographical focus of business activities could be
important as multinationals are " . . . likely to hedge as it could be beneficial in
protecting the competitive position of a firm which trades across borders." B rkman
and Bradbury (1996, p. 8) make a similar observation when they state that “ . . . firms
with overseas subsidiaries are more likely to use derivatives to manage foreign
currency exposures”. Thus, we would expect to find that multinational life insurance
firms, foreign-owned life insurers and those firms that sell life insurance products
across international borders are likely to have a greater propensity to use derivatives
than purely domestic life insurance firms.
4. Research design
We turn now to an empirical investigation of the determinants of deriv tives
use in the UK life insurance industry. Lack of appropriate data on the duration of
assets and liabilities prevented us from including a suitable proxy for the mismatch of
assets and liabilities among the explanatory variables.6 Also, the proxy variable
available to measure each company’s taxation status (i.e. tax tion divided by income
after expenses) was highly insignificant in all regressions and so has been excluded
from the model.7 To examine the derivative choice decision in UK life insurers we first
estimate a dummy dependent variable probit model, with firm size, leverage,
reinsurance, organizational form and international links as independent variables.
Second, to evaluate the extent of financial derivatives usage by UK life insurance firms,
we estimate a Heckman two-stage selection regression model. We used the H ckman
two-stage model because ordinary least squares (OLS) estimators do not satisfactorily
control for the qualitative difference between the zero-limit observations and
continuous data that c racterize the financial measurement of our dependent variable
(e.g., see Colquitt and Hoyt, p. 651).
Sample data of UK-based life insurance firms (n = 88) were obtained at random
from the Thesys insurance company database for 1995. The data are based on insurers’
statutory returns that are filed each year with the DTI (Form 13A)8. As Gallen and
Kipling (1996) point out, these statutory filings require insurance firms to give details
of derivative instruments used, including whether the derivatives are asset or liability-
based contracts, their particular classification (e.g. options, futures) and whether they
are fixed-income securities, equities, property or other derivative-type contracts. The
financial derivatives are recorded at their year-end closed-out positions and valued,
whenever possible, on a marked-to-market basis.
The probit model to be estimated, with n observations and m independent
variables, may be written as:
d Xj i ij
i
j
* = + +åb b e0 j = 1, . . . , n,  i = 1, . . . , m.
where b0, b1, . . . , bm are the parameters to be estimated and ej is a disturbance term
assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean and a constant variance equal to
one. The latent variable, dj
* , is not observed: the observed dummy variable, dj, is set
equal to one for life insurance firms which use derivatives and equal to zero otherwise.
In the model, dj equals one when dj
*  > 0 and is zero otherwise.
The Heckman two-stage model t  be estimated is expressed as:
å +++=
i
jjmijij uMXD ggg 0 j = 1, . . . , n,  i = 1, . . . , m.
where Dj is the extent of derivatives use by life insurance firms, measured by the
natural logarithm of the total notional value of all derivative contracts held at the end
of the year, and Mj is the inverse Mills ratio derived from the probit model. The error
term uj is assumed to have an expected value of zero and a constant variance.
The independent variables (Xij) are as follows:
Firm Size (X1j): As in Cummins et al (1997), firm size was measured by the natural
logarithm of total assets. The logarithmic transformation of the variable mitigates the
risk that our results may be confounded by extreme values in the data set and helps to
eliminate heteroskedasticity in the disturbances.
Leverage (X2j): Leverage was proxied by the ratio of the total actuarial value of long-
term liabilities to total assets. This enables comparable measures to be calculated for
both mutual and stock life insurance firms.
Reinsurance (X3j): Following Cummins et el (1997), the extent of reinsurance was
measured by the ratio of ceded reinsurance premiums written for the year to total
annual gross premiums written.
Organizational Form (X4j): As in Adams (1996), organizational form is represented
by a dummy variable, which is set equal to one for a stock life insurer and 0 for a
mutual life insurer.
International Links (X5j):  To capture the effects of international links, a further
dummy variable is included which is set equal to one for multinationals, foreign-owned
firms and those firms that earn a majority proportion of their annual premiums from
cross-border sales. The dummy variable is set equal to zero for purely domestic
companies.
5. Results
Descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients
The means, standard deviations, and minimum and maximum values of the
variables included in the study are shown in Table 1 for the 88 life insurance companies
in the sample, with separate data given for users and non-users of derivatives. The
table also shows a Pearson correlation coefficient matrix for these variables and the
variance-inflation factors (VIFs) for the independent variables to test for
multicollinearity. It can be seen from the table that 57 per cent of the sample used
derivatives during 1995 and that the companies included in the sample varied
substantially in the extent of their holdings of derivatives, their size, leverage and in
their use of reinsurance. With respect to organizational form, 70 per cent of the sample
firms were stock life insurers companies, with the other 30 per cent being mutuals.
Also, 44 per cent of the firms in our sample had international links of various kinds,
while the remaining 56 per cent were essentially domestic-only life insurance firms. On
average, the users of derivatives in our sample were larger firms with slightly more
leverage and less reinsurance compared with the non-users of derivatives. Also, as
expected, a bigger proportion of the users of derivatives had international links (59 per
cent, compared with just 24 per cent of the non-users), but a surprisingly large
proportion of the non-users in the sample were stock companies (81 per cent,
compared with just 63 per cent of the users).
TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics, Correlation Coefficients and Variance-Inflation Factors
This table shows the means, standard deviations and maximum and minimum
values of the variables used in the study for users and non-users of derivatives,
together with a matrix of correlation coefficients and variance-inflation factors
for the independent variables.
Descriptive statistics
           Mean          Standard     Minimum   Maximum
        deviation
Total sample
Derivative dummy (Der) 0.57 0.49 0       1
Log of derivative use (Ld) 8.75 1.83 2.94    12.28
Log of assets (Las)            13.49 2.76         5.58     17.45
Leverage (Lev) 0.88 0.13 0.14       1.04
Reinsurance (Rein) 0.12 0.17 0       0.83
Organizational form (Org) 0.70 0.46 0       1
International links (Int) 0.44 0.50 0       1
Users of derivatives
Log of assets            15.06 1.20            12.84    17.45
Leverage  0.89 0.90 0.67       1.00
Reinsurance  0.09 0.12 0       0.52
Organizational form   0.63 0.49 0       1
International links  0.59 0.50 0       1
Non-users of derivatives
Log of assets             11.31 2.83         5.58     16.00
Leverage  0.87 0.16 0.14       1.04
Reinsurance  0.16 0.23 0       0.83
Organizational form  0.81 0.40 0       1
International links  0.24 0.44 0       1
Pearson correlation coefficient matrix
Der  Ld Las   Lev  Rein Org
Las             0.65** 0.26**
Lev             0.17 -0.08   0.09
Rein            -0.19*      0.05  -0.24**   -0.03
Org            -0.21**     0.23** -0.19*   0.32**   0.03
Int             0.36** 0.09  0.39**   -0.02     -0.09-0.07
** Significantly different from zero at the 0.05 level (two-tailed test)
*   Significantly different from zero at the 0.1 level (two-tailed test)
Variance-inflation factors
Las   1.32      Lev   1.14     Rein   1.06     Form  1.18     Int  1.19
The bivariate correlation coefficients indicate that, as expected, the derivatives
use dummy variable is positively and significantly correlated with firm size and the
international links dummy, both at the 0.05 level in two-tailed tests. The correlation
with leverage is positive, but insignificant. There is also evidence of negative
correlation between the derivatives use dummy and the extent of reinsurance
(significant at the 0.1 level) and between the derivatives use dummy and the
organizational form dummy (significant at the 0.05 level). The extent of derivatives use
variable is positively correlated with firm size and the organizational form dummy, but
is not significantly correlated with any other independent variable.
The correlation coefficients between pairs of independent variables are generally low
(all less than 0.40), which suggests that problems with multicollinearity are unlikely.
However, collinearity can be present between more than two independent variables: to
test for this, we computed VIFs by regressing each independent variable in turn on all
the others and then calculating 1/(1 - R2), as recommended by Belsley et al (1980). All
the calculated VIFs are less than 2, so we can be reasonably confident that
multicollinearity is not a problem in this study.
Regression results
The ‘derivatives use’ equation was estimated as a univariate binomial prob t
model and a number of additional diagnostic statistics were calculated. The parameter
estimates and test statistics which resulted from the estimation are shown in Table 2.
The estimated coefficients have expected signs, with the exception of b4 (the
coefficient of the organizational form dummy), which is negative. The estimates of b0
(the intercept), b1 (the coefficient of firm size), b2 (the coefficient of leverage) and b4
(the coefficient of organizational form) are all significantly different from zero at the
0.05 level (in one-tailed tests) and the estimates of b3 nd b5 (the coefficients of
reinsurance and the international links dummy) are significantly different from zero at
the 0.1 level (in one-tailed tests).
 Table 2
Regression Results
This table shows the probit parameter estimates for the derivatives use equation
using data from a sample of 88 UK life insurance companies. A set of diagnostic
statistics is also shown.
Parameter1   Estimate2 t-value
     b0    -14.26**  -3.30
     b1       0.76**   3.78
     b2       5.00**   2.05
     b3     -1.85* -1.58
     b4     -0.83**             -1.69
     b5      0.49*      1.31
Test statistics
c2  =  58.89 (Reject hypothesis that all parameters are zero)
Pseudo-R2  =  0.87
LM test: c2   =  6.72 (Cannot reject hypothesis of homoskedasticity)
Predicted and actual values of the dependent variable:
Predicted        Totals
Actual     0 1
0              27        11 38
1                7        43 50
Totals                 34        54 88
Notes
1. b0 is the constant; b1 is the coefficient of the log of assets; 
b2 is the coefficient of leverage; b3 is the coefficient of 
reinsurance; b4 is the coefficient of organizational form; b5 is
the coefficient of international links.
2. ** = significantly different from zero at the 0.05 level (one-tailed test).
* = significantly different from zero at the 0.1 level (one-tailed test).
The test statistics include a c2 st tistic for testing the null hypothesis that the regression
coefficients (excluding the intercept) are all zero. The c2 value of 58.81 allows us to
reject this hypothesis. A second c2 statistic is calculated in a Lagrange Multiplier (LM)
test of homoskedasticity which compares the estimated model with an alternative
model which allows for heteroskedasticity in the disturbances. The calculated c2 value
of 6.72 (critical value = 11.1 at the 0.05 level) means that we cannot reject the
hypothesis of homoskedasticity on this evidence. The pseudo-R2 val e, calculated
using a formula suggested by Zavoina and McElvey (1975), is 0.87 which indicates a
reasonably good fit.9
Finally, Table 2 gives a cross-tabulation of the actual and predicted values of
the derivatives use dummy variable. It can be seen that the model correctly predicts the
use or non-use of derivatives in 70 out of the 88 cases, with 43 out of the 50 users of
derivatives correctly predicted.
Following the procedure of Colquitt and Hoyt (1997, p. 664), the extent of
derivatives use equation was estimated using Heckman’s two-stage procedure.10 Th
parameter estimates and test statistics are summarised in Table 3. When all of the
independent variables were included in the model (including the inverse Mills ratio
from the probit model11), only two had t-values greater than one. A stepwise
experimental procedure to eliminate insignificant variables was employed, therefore,
and this resulted in four of the variables being excluded from the regression. Of the six
independent variables included in the model, only firm size and organizational form
have any significant influence on the extent of derivative holdings by the life insurance
firms in our sample. In this model, the coefficient of determination is quite low (0.15),
but the results of the LM test do not allow us to reject the hypothesis of
homoskedasticity.
Implications of the results
We are now able to consider the implications of the regression results for the
determination of derivatives use by UK life insurers.
Firm size   In the probit model, the estimate of the coefficient of the logarithm of total
assets (b1) is positive, as expected, and statistically significant at the 0.05 level (one-
tailed test). Thus, there is strong evidence to support the hypothesis that larger life
insurance firms have a greater propensity to use derivatives than smaller life insurance
firms. This may be because larger firms use hedging to mitigate their agency incentive
conflicts, and/or because they can gain more from informational and/or scale
economies. It is also likely that larger firms will be able to employ specialized
personnel and so be able to ensure that “ . . . those who have responsibility for the
control of derivative instruments are sufficiently independent of the day-to-day
operators to ensure effective control” (Department of Trade and Industry, 1996,
Insurance Companies Regulations, Prudential Guidance Note, 1994/6, Annex C). Our
finding of a positive link between the propensity to use derivatives and firm size is also
consistent with the findings of previous US studies of the life insurance industry, such
as Cummins et al (1997) and Colquitt and Hoyt (1997).
In the Heckman two-stage model (with the insignificant variables, including the
inverse Mills ratio coefficient, excluded), the estimate of g1 s positive and significantly
greater than zero at the 0.05 level. The estimate, equal to 0.49, represents the elasticity
of derivative holdings with respect to firm size. As the estimate is less than one, it
suggests that as derivatives-using firms grow, their holdings of derivatives also grow
but at a slower rate. This may be because larger firms tend to employ a wider range of
risk management techniques than smaller firms. Fo  example, large life insurers may be
better able to engage in corporate risk management by modifying their operating and
financing strategies (Berkman and Bradbury, 1996).
Table 3
Heckman Two-Stage Regression Results
This table shows the Heckman parameter estimates for the derivatives use
equation using data from a sample of 88 UK life insurance companies. A set of
diagnostic statistics is also shown.
Parameter1 Estimate2 t-value3 Estimate t-value
   g0    -5.12 -0.34    0.66 0.16
   g1     0.79   1.05    0.49** 1.89
   g2     1.02    0.23      -   -
   g3     -0.35  -0.02      -   -
   g4      0.90   1.17    1.09** 2.08
   g5      0.20     0.32      -   -
   gm      1.38   0.53      -   -
Test statistics
Mean of dependent variable:              8.75
S.d. of dependent variable: 1.83
Standard error of regression: 1.72
LM test: 2.16
F statistic: 4.99
R-squared: 0.15
Notes
1. g0 is the constant; g1 is the coefficient of the log of assets; g2 is the
coefficient of leverage; 3 is the coefficient of reinsurance; g4 is the
coefficient of rganizational form; g5 is the coefficient of
international links; gm is the coefficient of the inverse Mills ratio.
2. ** = significantly different from zero at the 0.05 level (one-tailed test).
* = significantly different from zero at the 0.1 level (one-tailed test).
3. All standard errors of the estimates are heteroskedastic-consistent.
Risk of insolvency   Two variables were included as proxies for the risk of insolvency:
leverage and reinsurance. If hedging against risk were the main motive for derivatives
use by life insurance firms, we would expect to find a positive relation between the
propensity to use derivatives and leverage and a negative relation between the
propensity to use derivatives and the extent of reinsurance.
In the probit model, the estimate of the coefficient of leverage (b2) is ind ed
positive and significant at the 0.05 level (one-tailed test). This result is consistent with
the findings of Colquitt and Hoyt (1997) and supports the view that life insurance firms
with higher leverage, and therefore a higher probability of bankruptcy, will have a
greater propensity to hedge. Furthermore, the use of financial derivatives could enable
highly leveraged life insurers to maximize firm value by writing new business without
altering the level of assumed financial risk for existing policyholders. Indeed, Staking
and Babbel (1995, p. 698) point out that in some jurisdictions, such as some states in
the US, insurance “. . . cannot be underwritten unless the insurer obtains a minimum
grade from one of the rating agencies. If such business is valuable, hedging will be
undertaken . . .”. In the probit model, the estimate of the coefficient of reinsurance (b3)
also has its expected sign (negative), but can only be regarded as significant at the 0.1
level in a one-tailed test. Thus, we have some evidence to support the findings of
Cummins et al.‘s (1997) analysis from the US property-casualty insurance industry that
there is a substitutive relation between derivatives use and the extent of reinsurance in
life insurance firms. Nonetheless, our results are contrary to those reported by
Cummins et al. (1997) and Colquitt and Hoyt (1997) in the US life insurance industry
where a complementary relation between the propensity to use financial derivatives and
the amount of reinsurance was found.
Furthermore, in the H ckman two-stage model, neither leverage nor
reinsurance has a significant influence on the extent of derivative holdings. Thus,
although these variables influence the decision to hold derivatives, they have little or
no effect on the value of derivatives held in our sample.
Organizational form   The estimate of the coefficient of the rganizational form
dummy variable (b4) is negative in the probit model, so our expectation that stock life
insurance firms would have a greater propensity to use derivatives more than mutuals
is not supported. However, the alternative views, expressed by Kleffner and Doherty
(1996) and Ralfe (1996), which suggest that mutual life insurance companies will have
a greater propensity to use hedging instruments, does receive some support from our
results: the coefficient estimate is significantly less than zero at the 0.05 level in a one-
tailed test. This is a result, therefore, that lends support to the view, such as that
expressed by Colquitt and Hoyt (1997), that the managers in mutuals tend to be more
risk-averse and, given their lack of equity capital to help them deal with adverse
economic conditions, will have a stronger inclination than stock insurance firms to use
derivative instruments as part of their risk management strategies.
Apparently contrary to our results, however, Colquitt and Hoyt (1997) found a
positive relation between the propensity to hedge and an organizatio al form dummy
for US life insurers, although in the same model they found a negative relation between
the propensity to hedge and an interaction term, defined as the product of firm size and
the organizational form dummy. They concluded (p. 663) that this supported the view,
expressed originally in Mayers and Smith (1981), that “ . . . as stock firms become
large, they tend to behave more like mutuals” (p. 18).12 However, when we included
the same interaction term in our model, it proved to be insignificant, with a t-value of  -
0.3.
In the Heckman two-stage model, the estimate of the coefficient of the
organizational form dummy variable is positive and significant at the 0.05 level. This
suggests that, of those life insurance firms in our sample which held derivatives, the
stock firms tend to have larger holdings than mutuals.
To investigate further the link between derivatives use and organizational form,
two chi-squared independence tests were conducted. In a test of independence
between organizational form (mutual or stock) and use or non-use of derivatives, a chi-
squared value of 11.2 was calculated. As the critical value is 3.84 at the 0.05 level of
significance, we can reject the hypothesis of independence. Only 26.9 per cent of the
mutual companies in the sample were non-users, compared with 58.1 per cent of stock
companies, so this result suggests that the mutual life insurance companies in our
sample have a greater propensity to use derivative instruments than the stock life
insurance companies (a result supported by the pro it regression results). The second
chi-squared test investigated a possible link between the organiza ional form of the
companies that used derivatives and the types of derivative instruments used (futures,
options or ‘other’ forms). The calculated chi-squared value of 0.23 (with a critical
value of 5.98) suggests that no such link exists.
International links   As expected, in the probit model, the coefficient of the
international links dummy variable is positive, but only significant at the 0.1 level in a
one-tailed test. This provides some support for the view expressed by Joseph and
Hewins (1997) that multinational life insurance firms, foreign-owned firms and those
with cross-border life insurance sales are more likely to use derivative instruments than
purely domestic life insurance firms. However, in the Heckman two-stage model, the
international links dummy does not have a significant influence on the extent of
derivative holdings in our sample. This finding is consistent with that of Berkman and
Bradbury (1996) in their study of derivatives use in the New Zealand corporate sector.
6.  Conclusions
In this study, we have investigated the determinants of derivatives use and the
financial extent of that use by UK life insurers. Drawing on modern corporate finance
theory and similar recent studies relating to the US insurance industry, we first
discussed the possible relation between the use of derivative instruments and a number
of firm-specific characteristics: firm size, leverage, asset-liability mismatch,
reinsurance, organizational form, taxation status and international links. In the
empirical study, we included five of these as explanatory variables in both a probit and
a Heckman two-stage model. Consistent with our prior expectations, the results of the
probit regression, suggest that the propensity to use derivatives is positively influenced
by a firm’s size, leverage and international links, and negatively influenced by the
extent of reinsurance. The inverse relation between the propensity to use derivatives
and reinsurance was contrary to that reported in the US life insurance industry by
Cummins et al. (1997) and Colquitt and Hoyt (1997). We also found that mutual life
insurance firms have a greater propensity to use derivatives than stock life insurance
firms, a finding which is again different to that observed in US-based studies (e.g.
Cummins et al, 1997). The positive link with leverage and the negative link with
reinsurance lend support to the hypothesis that UK life insurers use derivative
instruments as part of a risk management strategy, rather than as a speculative means
of income generation. A further implication of our results is that if ‘capital-poor’
mutual life insurance companies in the UK are using derivatives as a substitute for
capital, then this may call for tighter external monitoring of the systems of internal
control in these firms.
The results of the H ckman two-stage regression suggest that the extent of
derivatives use is positively related to firm size (though with an elasticity less than
one), and that stock life insurance firms (that use derivatives) have larger holdings of
derivatives than mutual firms. But we found no significant relation between the extent
of derivative holdings and leverage, reinsurance or the international links dummy
variable.
Data limitations forced us to exclude two possible independent variables from
the model. Finding appropriate measures of the mismatch between asset and liability
duration and the taxation status of UK life insurers, and then including them in a
‘derivatives use’ regression model, would be an interesting future research project. A
further possible limitation of the study is that the data used cover only a single year and
may therefore be affected by short-term fluctuations in derivatives usage. As more data
becomes available, a panel data study of derivatives use may provide more robust
evidence. In spite of these omissions, we feel that the evidence reported here provides
some useful insights into the determination of der vatives use in the UK life insurance
industry, which will hopefully inspire other researchers to investigate the topic further.
References
Accounting Standards Board (July, 1997). Supplement to Financial Reporting
Exposure Draft, Derivatives and Other Financial Instruments: Disclosures, Lond n:
Accounting Standards Board.
Adams, M.B. (1995). ‘The balance sheet structure of New Zealand life insurance
companies: an empirical test of the managerial discretion hypothesis’, Accoun ing and
Finance, 35 (May): 21-45.
Adams, M.B. (1996). ‘The reinsurance decision in the life insurance firm: an empirical
test of the risk-bearing hypothesis’, Accounting and Finance, 36 (May): 15-30.
Association of British Insurers (1996). Insurance Statistics Yearbook, ABI, London.
Belsley, D.A., Kuh, E. and Welsch, R.E. (1980). Regression Diagnostics: Identifying
Influential Data and Sources of Collinearity, New York: John Wiley.
Berkman, H. and Bradbury, M.E. (1996). ‘Empirical evidence on the corporate use of
derivatives’, Financial Management, 25 (Summer): 5-13.
Brealey, R.A. and Myers, S.C. (1996). Principles of Corporate Finance. New York:
McGraw-Hill.
Colquitt, L.L. and Hoyt, R.E. (1996). ‘An analysis of futures and options use by life
insurers’, Journal of Insurance Issues, 19 (Fall): 149-162.
Colquitt, L.L. and Hoyt, R.E. (1997). ‘Determinants of corporate hedging b havior:
evidence from the life insurance industry’, The Journal of Risk and Insurance, 64
(December): 649-671.
Cooper, D. (1996). ‘It’s reinsurance, Jim, but not as we know it’, The Actuary, 6
(April): 15.
Cummins, J.D., Phillips, R.D. and Smith, S.D. (1997). ‘Corporate hedging in the
insurance industry: the use of financial derivatives by U.S. insurers’, North American
Actuarial Journal, 1 (January): 13-49.
De Marzo, P and Duffie, D. (1995). ‘Corporate incentives for hedging and hedge
accounting’, The Review of Financial Studies, 8 (Fall): 743-771.
Department of Trade and Industry (1996). Insurance Companies Regulations,
Prudential Guidance Note (1994/6), London: Department of Trade and Industry.
Faculty/Institute of Actuaries (1996). GN25: Investments – Derivative Instruments,
Edinburgh/London: Faculty/Institute of Actuaries.
Froot, K.A., Scharfstein, D.S. and Stein, J.C. (1993). ‘Risk management: co-ordinating
corporate investment and financing policies’, The Journal of Finance, 48 (December),
pp. 1629-1658.
Gallen, M.C. and Kipling, M.R. (1996). ‘Recent developments in life office financial
reporting’,  British Actuarial Journal, 2 (Part II): 479-517.
Hentschel, L. and Smith, C.W. (1997). ‘Risks in derivative markets: implications for
the insurance industry’, The Journal of Risk and Insurance, 64 (June): 323-345.
Hoyt, R.E. (1989a). ‘Use of financial futures by life insurers’, Journal of Risk and
Insurance, 56 (December), pp. 740-749.
Hoyt, R.E. (1989b). ‘Hedging a credited rate for a universal life policy’, Journa  of
Insurance Issues, 12, 22-37.
Hoyt, R.E. and H. Khang (1997). Determinants of corporate insurance purchases:
empirical evidence, University of Georgia Working Paper, Athens, Georgia, USA.
Insurance Companies Regulations (United Kingdom) (1994), London: Her Majesty’s
Stationery Office.
Jensen, M.C. and Meckling, W.H. (1976). ‘Theory of the firm: managerial behavior,
agency costs and ownership structure’, Journal of Financial Economics, 3 (October):
305-360.
Joseph, N.L and Hewins, R.D. (1997). ‘The motives for corporate hedging among UK
multinationals’, International Journal of Finance and Economics, 2 (April): 151-171.
Kleffner, A.E. and Doherty, N.A. (1996). ‘Costly risk bearing and the supply of
catastrophic insurance’, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 63 (December): 657-671.
Mayers, D. and Smith, C.W. (1981). ‘Contractual provisions, rganizational structure,
and conflict control in insurance markets’, Journal of Business, 54 (April): 407-433.
Mayers, D. and Smith, C.W. (1987). ‘Corporate insurance and the underinvestment
problem’,  Journal of Risk and Insurance, 54 (January): 45-54.
Mayers, D. and Smith, C.W. (1988). ‘Ownership structure across lines of property-
casualty insurance’, Journal of  Law and Economics, 31 (October): 351-378.
Nance, D.R., Smith, C.W. and Smithson, C.W. (1993). ‘On the determinants of
corporate hedging’, Journal of Finance, 68 (March): 267-284.
Oldfield, G.S. and Santomero, A.M. (1997). ‘Risk management in financial
institutions’, Sloan Management Review, 39 (Fall): 33-46.
Ralfe, J. (1996). ‘Reasons to be hedging - 1,2, 3’, Risk, 9 (July): 20-21.
Santomero, A.M. (1995). ‘Financial risk management: the whys and hows’, Financial
Markets, Institutions and Instruments, 4 (December): 1-14.
Santomero, A.M and Babbel, D.F. (1997). ‘Financial risk management by insurers: an
analysis of the process’, The Journal of Risk and Insurance, 64 (June): 231-270.
Sinkey, J. F. and Carter, D. (1997). ‘Derivatives in U.S. banking: theory, practice and
empirical evidence’, in Schachter, B. (ed.) Derivatives, Regulation and Banking. New
York: Elsevier Press.
Smith, C.W. and Stulz, R.M. (1985). ‘The determinants of firms' hedging policies’,
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 20 (December): 391-405.
Smith, C.W. and Warner, J. (1979). ‘On financial contracting: an analysis of bond
covenants’, Journal of Financial Economics, 7 (June): 117-161.
Sole, T.C. (1995). ‘The puzzle of life office tax’, Bri ish Actuarial Journal, 1 (Part I):
79-105.
Staking, K.B. and Babbel, D.F. (1995). ‘The relation between capital structure, interest
rate sensitivity, and market value in the property-liability insurance industry’, Journal
of Risk and Insurance, 62 (December): 690-718.
Wilson, A.C. and Hollman, K.W. (1995). ‘Proposed accounting for derivatives’,
Journal of Insurance Regulation, 14: 251-268.
Zahra, S.A. and Pearce, J.A (1995), ‘Board of directors and corporate financial
performance: a review and integrative model’, Journal of Management, 15 (February):
291-334.
Zavoina, R. and McElvey, W. (1975), ‘A statistical model for the analysis of ordinal
level dependent variables’, Journal of Mathematical Sociology, Summer: 103-120.
                                                 
End-notes
1 Wilson and Hollman (1996, p. 252) report that derivatives are “. . . financial 
arrangements whose value is linked to, or derived from, the change in value 
of some underlying security, commodity, index, rate or other financial 
measure or asset”.
2 A future is a forward contract that is traded on an exchange and which commits
the holder to buy or sell an asset at a specific price at some future date. An
option is a contract that gives the buyer the right to buy or sell an asset at a
given price on or before a specified date. A swap is a contract by which the
parties exchange cash flows that are linked to a liability or asset. Commonly,
swaps include interest rate and currency contracts. Currency swaps involve the
exchange of the principal sum as well as income streams. Additionally, the
swap market is over-the-counter and not exchange-traded. A problem with
valuing derivative positions is that over-the-counter contracts have no
observable market values and are sometimes therefore ‘valued’ at exercise price
or nominal value. This may considerably overestimate the likely settlement of
differences. Similarly, the value of an option contract is much less than its
exercise price, but the latter may be used for putting a ‘value’ on option
positions, especially for over-the-counter contracts. This problem should be
borne in mind in interpreting the derivative values for the USA and the UK
quoted in the paper.
3 Although the UK’s Insurance Companies (Amendment) Regulations (1994)
require greater disclosure of derivatives use for solvency monitoring purposes,
there are no explicit restrictions on the use of derivatives for income
enhancement. However, the 1994 regulations do attempt to reduce
opportunities for the speculative use of derivatives by insurance firms. As
mentioned in section 2, the use of appointed actuaries to monitor and report on
the financial condition of UK life insurers each year is one corporate
governance mechanism that aims to alleviate the risk of speculation through
financial derivatives.
4 Another possible reason for a positive link between the use of derivatives and
firm size is that large firms are likely to have a comparative advantage in the
fixed rate market, but are likely to have a fair proportion of floating rate
sensitive assets. They can use their comparative advantage by borrowing fixed
and swapping some of this into floating rate debt.
5 In general, policyholders are not only less diversified than shar holders but 
they are also tied-in to policies by prohibitive surrender terms. As a result, 
policyholders “ . . . cannot cancel past overages and obtain refunds if they 
perceive that the riskiness of the insurer is increasing . . .”. (Staking and 
Babbel, 1995, p. 692). Thus, the insured is inhibited from effectively 
controlling for a reduction in insurer quality by canceling the insurance 
policy in the way that a depositor could withdraw or sell his/her investments 
                                                                                                                                
in a company.
6 The data available from the insurance companies’ DTI annual returns do not
permit the average duration of assets and liabilities to be estimated. Measuring
the asset-liability mismatch by taking the difference between long-term assets
and long-term liabilities (scaled by total assets), as used by Colq itt andHoyt
(1997), does not in our view provide a satisfactory proxy variable. This is
because the accounting values of assets/liabilities reported by UK life insurers
in the DTI resturns do not always enable one to determine the mix of
assets/liabilities of various duration that are held by such firms. In any case,
such a measure would be very similar to our leverage proxy.
7 Other prior US-based insurance industry studies, such as Colq itt and Hoyt 
(1997) and Cummins et al (1997), also report that the taxation variable does 
not explain derivatives use by firms. It is possible that the unique taxation 
base used in the insurance industry could be confounding the empirical 
results. Santomero (1995, p. 4) adds that to the extent that “. . . significant 
discretion exists in tax reporting, tax considerations may not motivate actual 
decision-making (on hedging) nearly as much as . . . theory suggests”.
8 The Thesys database is not comprehensive. For example, it excludes insurers 
which are no longer writing new business due to solvency problems. Our 
sample (n = 88) represents roughly one-third of the total number of UK-
registered life insurance firms (N = 270 approx.). Our data also excludes 
friendly societies, reinsurers and pensions funds as they do not write much 
direct life insurance business.
9 Zavoina and McElvey (1975) suggest the following pseudo-R2 measure for 
the probit model:
R2  =  
( )
( )
var
var
y
y
f
f1+
where yf  = E[y*½y].
10 A tobit regression would be an alternative to the H ckman two-stage
procedure. However, when we ran a tobit regression, the results were not
substantially different from those obtained from the Heck an method and so
are not reported. In addition, in Colquitt and Hoyt (1997), the estimates of the
bias parameters obtained from the Heckman two-stage regression were not
significant, so that their derivatives use models were actually estimated by
ordinary least squares.
11 The inverse Mills ratio is the expectation of the residual obtained from
estimating the probit model.
11 As a result of the accumulation of reserves over many years, several mutuals
operating in established insurance markets, such as the UK and the US, are
                                                                                                                                
large firms. For example, the UK’s second largest life insurer, Standard Life, is
a mutual form of organization with approximately £25 billion of assets in 1994.
